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I. INTRODUCTION:
COUNTER-INTUITIVE TRENDS IN AN ARMY AT WAR
“[T]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow,
and his orphan . . . .”1
—Abraham Lincoln
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 catalyzed two wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.2 While combat broke Afghan and Iraqi military
*
J.D. 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 1997, United States Military
Academy at West Point. The author commanded two companies in combat in Iraq and is a recipient
of the Bronze Star and Meritorious Service medals. The author has experience dealing with the
Army disability system, having been involved in several cases as a supervisor and having gone
through the disability system himself.
1. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1865).
2. See Jennifer S. Martin, Adapting U.C.C. § 2-615 Excuse for Civilian-Military
Contractors in Wartime, 61 FLA. L. REV. 99, 101 (2009) (“On September 18, 2001, Congress
granted President Bush the ‘authori[ty] to use all necessary and appropriate force’ to combat
terrorism in the Middle East.” (alteration in original) (quoting Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001))).
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forces with relatively few American casualties,3 both wars devolved into
protracted insurgencies. As of March 3, 2009, 3,854 American service
members had been killed in action in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 While combat
deaths are widely reported, the number of wounded service members is
less visible but staggering nonetheless. According to the Department of
Defense, 33,790 American service members had been wounded in combat
in Iraq and Afghanistan as of March 3, 2009.5
These statistics reveal that the wounded-to-killed ratio of soldiers
serving in the Iraq and Afghan wars is approximately nine to one.6 A
comparison of this ratio to past wars indicates that a much higher
percentage of troops survive battlefield injuries today compared to only a
few decades ago.7 The marked increase in battlefield injury survival can be
attributed to a number of causes: improved personnel and vehicle armor,
advances in medical technology and training, increased use of helicopters
in evacuating injured troops, closer proximity of field hospitals to combat
areas, and rapid evacuation of critically wounded soldiers to major
hospitals in Europe and the United States.8
While the increased soldier survival rate is welcome news, it has
imposed a heavier burden on the military’s physical disability system. An
increase in soldier referral through the disability system is logical under the
circumstances, as many wounded troops are no longer able to serve. Thus,
in 2001, there were 7,218 Army active duty and reserve soldiers referred to
the disability system,9 while in 2005, after nearly two full years of war in
3. The general terms “casualty” and “casualties,” as used throughout this Note, encompasses
both military personnel killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA). The terms include
neither deaths and injuries resulting from non-hostile causes, nor civilian injuries or deaths.
4. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Casualty Update, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Casualty Update]. Note that this website updates casualties
regularly and unfortunately, the casualty figures reported on a given visit to the site will probably be
higher than the figures listed on March 3, 2009.
5. See id.
6. The wounded-to-killed ratio is calculated by dividing the number of service members
wounded in action by the number killed in action. See id.
7. Wounded-to-killed approximate ratios for previous wars are as follows: Revolutionary
War—1.4:1; War of 1812—2.0:1; Mexican War—2.4:1; Civil War (Union forces only)—2.0:1;
Spanish-American War—4.3:1; World War I—3.8:1; World War II—2.3:1; Korean War—3.1:1;
Vietnam War—3.2:1; Persian Gulf War—3.2:1. U.S. Navy, Navy Department Library, American
War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, tbl.1, available at
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/american%20war%20casualty.htm (last updated July 13,
2005).
8. See Thomas M. Beaver & Paul J. Schenarts, Battlefield Surgery 2005, 3 INT’L J. SURGERY
171, 174–75 (2005).
9. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-06-362, MILITARY DISABILITY
SYSTEM: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO ENSURE CONSISTENT AND TIMELY OUTCOMES FOR
RESERVE AND ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE MEMBERS 38 tbl.6 (2006), available at
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Iraq and four years of fighting in Afghanistan, this number totaled 13,748
soldiers,10 an increase of more than 90%.
Paradoxically, the number of soldiers who received permanent
disability retirement benefits as a result of their referral to the disability
system declined. After five years of war and a 90% increase in disability
cases, the Army afforded disability retirement benefits to only 3.6% of
soldiers referred for disability processing from January to August 2005,
down from 10.5% in 2001.11 This decrease in permanent retirement
disability ratings is almost 67%. 12
Figure 1: Trends in Army Disability Retirements and Referrals13
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http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06362.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY
SYSTEM].
10. Id. at 38 tbl. 6.
11. See GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 50 tbl.14. Calculations
made using only permanent disability retirees.
12. See id. at 9. Soldiers who separate from military service for medical conditions, but who
do not qualify for medical retirement benefits, receive a one-time lump-sum severance payment,
whereas retirees receive personal and family medical benefits as well as a small pension for life. See
infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of benefits resulting from
physical disability ratings.
13. See GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 50 tbl.14; id. at 38
tbl. 6.
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Moreover, not only did the percentage of soldiers deemed qualified as
permanent disability retirees decrease from 2001 to 2005, the actual
number of soldiers so rated also fell.14 In 2000, across all military
branches, there were 102,000 disability retirees.15 In 2006, after five years
of war and a 90% increase in disability cases, there were only 87,000
disability retirees.16
Figure 2: Number of Soldiers Qualified for Permanent Disability
Retirement (2001-2005)17
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These trends have not gone unnoticed by the media, veterans’ advocacy
groups, or policy makers at the highest levels of government.18 Each offers
14. See id. at 50 tbl.14; infra note 17 and accompanying text.
15. Linda Robinson, Insult to Injury: New Data Reveal an Alarming Trend: Vets’ Disabilities
are Being Downgraded, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 16, 2007, at 44, 46.
16. Id.
17. See GAO REPORT, MILITARY DISABILITY SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 50 tbl.14; id. at 38
tbl. 6. 2005 statistics extrapolated using data available through August.
18. See, e.g., id. at 50; Ginger Thompson, Bush Calls for Simplifying Military Disability
System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at A25; Ann Scott Tyson, Army’s Disability Benefit Review
System Feels Strain, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2007, at A8.
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different theories as to the cause of the downward trend of disability
ratings, ranging from institutional or personal bias against injured or ill
soldiers (especially those not injured in combat)19 to budgetary
constraints.20
Whatever the reasons for these trends, Congress, the media, and
advocacy groups have generally acknowledged that there are problems in
the disability system.21 “[S]ervice members often feel like they have to
fight for a rating that accurately reflects their disability, i.e., the service
they belong to and put on the uniform of acts as their adversary,” said U.S.
Senator Carl Levin in his opening statement at a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing on military disability.22 “We simply have to do better
than this.”23
Numerous hearings, studies, and commissions have analyzed the
military disability process. The most recent study came from the Veterans’
Disability Benefits Commission, jointly appointed by the executive and
legislative branches to recommend reforms to the military disability
system.24 In its October 2007 final report, the Commission made a litany of
macro-level recommendations, which will no doubt help improve the
disability system across the services.25 However, unless decision-makers
19. Old soldiers say the root of the problem is an Army culture that preaches a “suck it up”
attitude. “If you ask for what you are due, you are perceived to be whining or trying to pad your
pocket,” says a retired command sergeant major. “If you’re not bleeding, you’re not hurt. That’s
what we were taught.” Robinson, supra note 15, at 50.
20. “The total amount paid out for these benefit awards has remained roughly constant in
wartime and peacetime, leading disabled veterans . . . to allege that a budgetary ceiling has been
imposed to contain war costs.” Id. at 46–47. Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission Chairman
Lieutenant General (Retired) James Terry Scott stated in testimony to Congress, “[The Department
of Defense] has [a] strong incentive to assign ratings less than 30 percent so that only separation
pay is required and continuing family health care is not provided.” Departments of Defense and
Veterans Affairs Disability Rating Systems and the Transition of Service Members from the
Department of Defense to the Department of Veterans Affairs: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Armed Servs. and S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (statement of Lt. Gen.
James Terry Scott, Chairman of Veterans’ Disability Benefits Comm.) [hereinafter Testimony of
Chairman Scott].
21. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 50 (“‘It’s hard to ignore the fact that in time of war they
are giving out less disability. Is it policy? I don’t know. But it is a fact.’” (quoting Steve Robinson,
Dir. of Veterans for America)).
22. Hearing on DoD and VA Disability Rating Systems & Transition of Service Members
from DoD to the VA Before the S. Comms. on Armed Servs. & Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong.
1–6 (Apr. 12, 2007) (opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
23. Id.
24. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, §§ 1501–
1502, 117 Stat. 1392, 1676–77 (2003).
25. See generally VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY:
VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007) (making
recommendations regarding improvement of the disability system for military personnel).
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apply the rules to specific cases in accordance with administrative law
principles and court decisions in disability cases, the reforms necessary to
improve the military disability system are incomplete. This Note provides
a legal framework to assist those decision-makers—the Physical
Evaluation Boards (PEB), intermediate review officials, the Army Board
for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), and legal counsel
involved in the process—in making legally sufficient disability decisions.
Part II of this Note explains in detail the Army disability process. Part
III discusses case law and legal principles applicable to disability cases,
recommends that PEBs prepare findings in accordance with the substantial
evidence standard, and uses examples from the author’s own disability
case to illustrate how the application of administrative law principles could
lead to improved decision-making. Part IV summarizes the legal principles
discussed in Part III and illustrates the importance of bottom-up reform.
II. A COMPLEX PROCESS: THE ARMY DISABILITY SYSTEM
“At first glance, the disability ratings process seems
straightforward. . . . But the system is hideously complicated in practice.”26
Most law review articles dealing with the military disability systems focus
chiefly on explaining the system because military lawyers, leaders, and
soldiers alike simply do not understand the process.27 Thus, an explanation
of the Army disability process is in order. First, it is important to
distinguish the Veterans Administration disability process from the Army’s
disability systems.28 By congressional mandate,29 the Army uses the
Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) to
26. See Robinson, supra note 15, 46.
27. See Thaddeus J. Hoffmeister, A Practitioner’s Note on Physical Evaluation Boards,
ARMY LAW., Feb. 2001, at 49, 49; James R. Julian, What You Absolutely, Positively Need to Know
About the Physical Evaluation Board, ARMY LAW., May 1996 31, 31; Eva M. Novak, The Army
Physical Disability System, 112 MIL. L. REV. 273, 273 (1986); Chuck R. Pardue, Military Disability
in a Nutshell, 109 MIL. L. REV. 149, 149 (1985).
28. See Army Board for Correction of Military Records [hereinafter ABCMR], Memorandum
of Consideration, No. AC95-01533, at 3 (Nov. 25, 1998), available at
http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY1995/00000-13999/9508236.rtf (last visited Mar. 5,
2009).
There is a difference between the VA and Army disability systems. While both the
VA and the Army use the VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) to
determine disability ratings, not all of the general policies set forth in the VASRD
apply to the Army; thus there are sometimes differences in ratings.
Id.; see also Nat’l Coal. for Homeless Veterans, Homeless Veterans Reintegration Program:
Understanding the VA and DoD Disability Benefit System Fact Sheet #1, at 2 (Mar. 2008),
http://www.nchv.org/docs/VADoDFactSheet11.pdf.
29. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 1203(b)(4) (2009).
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determine the degree of a soldier’s disability.30 But there are important
differences between the VA disability system and the military services’.31
The VA rates all of a soldier’s disabilities, even if those disabilities do not
render the soldier unfit for military service.32 The Army, on the other hand,
only rates and compensates for those disabilities that render the soldier
unable to serve on active duty.33 Further, the Army and its sister services
are not bound by the VA ratings.34 As one ABCMR memorandum put it:
“The VA, operating under its own policies and regulation, assigns
disability ratings as it sees fit. Any rating action by the VA does not
compel the Army to modify its rating.”35
The Department of Defense implemented its disability system under the
authority of Department of Defense Directive 1332.18,36 pursuant to
congressional authority granted in Title 10 of the United States Code,
§ 1216.37 In turn, the Army promulgated Army Regulation 635-4038 to
govern the administration of the Army disability system.39

30. The VASRD is codified by 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2008). The VASRD prescribes symptoms for
a comprehensive list of potential medical conditions that correspond to a particular disability rating,
ranging from 0% to up to 100%. Id.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. U.S. Army Human Res. Command, Army Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES),
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/Pda/ArmyPDES.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009)
[hereinafter USAHRC, APDES]; see also Robinson, supra note 15, at 49.
33. See Pardue, supra note 27, at 163.
In order for a member to be discharged or retired from the Army for physical
disability, there must be a determination that the soldier is physically unfit. This is
so even if the member has serious physical impairments ratable by the VA or has a
physical condition listed as a physical fitness retention standard under Chapter 3
of AR 40-501. A member may fail to meet the retention standards of AR 40-501
and have ratable disabilities of 100 percent disability from the VASRD, and still
be found fit for duty and not receive any disability from the military.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
34. See Johnson v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 648, 650 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
35. ABCMR, Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC97-06529, at 3 (Nov. 10, 1998),
available at http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY1997/9706529.rtf (last visited Mar. 5,
2009); see also USAHRC, APDES, supra note 32.
36. JOHN P. WHITE, DEPUTY SEC’Y OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.18,
SEPARATION OR RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY 1 (Nov. 4, 1996), available at http://www.dt
ic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/133218p.pdf.
37. 10 U.S.C. § 1216(b)(4) (2006).
38. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 635-40, PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS: PHYSICAL
EVALUATION FOR RETENTION, RETIREMENT, OR SEPARATION i (Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter AR 63540], available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r635_40.pdf.
39. Pardue, supra note 27, at 150.
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AR 635-40 outlines the military disability process and regulates its
stages.40 The regulations first require evaluation and treatment of a soldier
who has an injury or illness.41 A soldier may be referred for such medical
evaluation by commanders of medical treatment facilities42 or field
commanders.43 If medical evaluation and treatment reveal that the soldier
is not fit to perform military duty because of a medical condition, then the
medical facility will refer the soldier to a Medical Evaluation Board, or
MEB.44 The MEB then evaluates the soldier based upon retention
standards found in Army Regulation 40-501.45 AR 40-501 sets out medical
conditions that “render a Soldier unfit for further military service and
which fall below the standards required for [soldiers on active
duty] . . . .”46
If the MEB deems a soldier unfit for military service, he is referred to a
Physical Evaluation Board, or PEB .47 Once a soldier is referred to a PEB,
the Board’s first consideration is whether the soldier is fit or unfit for
duty.48 Given that the MEB has already determined the soldier has a
medical condition rendering him or her “unfit for further military
service,”49 the requirement that the PEB determine fitness for duty is
confusing.
The difference between the boards is that the MEB determines fitness
according to medical standards only, while the PEB then determines if a
soldier’s medical condition prevents the satisfactory performance of his
duty.50 According to AR 635-40, “[a]n unfitting, or ratable condition, is
one which renders the Soldier unable to perform the duties of their office,
grade, rank, or rating in such a way as to reasonably fulfill the purpose of
their employment on active duty.”51
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

AR 635-40, supra note 38, at i.
AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-9, at 9.
Id. § 4-7, at 9.
Id. § 4-8, at 9.
Id. § 4-9, at 9.
Id. § 4-10, at 9.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REGULATION 40-501, MEDICAL SERVICES, STANDARDS OF MEDICAL
FITNESS § 3-1 (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter AR 40-501], available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/
epubs/pdf/r40_501.pdf.
47. Id. § 3-3, at 21. The PEB is the most critical step in the Army disability process, as its
findings generally determine the benefits to which a soldier is entitled. Id. § 3-4, at 21. Even though
judicial appeals technically appeal the judgment of the Army Board for the Correction of Military
Records, it is the PEB decision that is often the subject of that appeal, as the administrative appeals
process within the Army rarely disturbs the PEB finding. See generally, e.g., ABCMR,
Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC97-11215, available at http://boards.law.af.mil
/ARMY/BCMR/CY1997/9711215.rtf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
48. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-19(d)(1), at 14.
49. AR 40-501, supra note 46, § 3-1, at 20.
50. See Julian, supra note 27, at 33.
51. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 3-5(c), at 6.
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The PEB considers medical and performance evaluations in its
determination, and either may be more probative to the fitness decision,
depending on circumstances.52 A finding of unfitness cannot rest solely on
certain effects that a medical condition may have on military service,53
such as creating a failure to qualify for specialized duty, inability to deploy
worldwide, inability to transfer between different components of the
service, a lack of special skills in demand, or failure to meet initial medical
entry requirements.54
A condition that existed before the soldier entered the service will not
be grounds for a finding of unfitness,55 even if the condition did not cause
problems before military service.56 Further, there is a presumption of
fitness if a soldier is retiring or separating through a process independent
from the disability system.57 If applicable, this presumption is difficult to
overcome.58 If a soldier is found fit for duty, he will return to his unit and
perform duties in accordance with his medical limitations.59
If the PEB finds a soldier unfit for duty, the board next assigns a
disability rating,60 assuming all other criteria for eligibility for medical
disability benefits are met.61 As discussed later, the PEB rates only
disqualifying conditions62 using the VASRD.63 All other medical
conditions, even if listed on the VASRD, will not form the basis of a
disability rating from the Army.64 This point is vital to understanding PEB
disability ratings.65
The decision of fitness is subjective. Soldiers performing duties may be found fit
for duty, even though suffering from a serious illness or injury. Exactly what
makes a soldier unfit varies not only among MOSs but also among soldiers within
a particular MOS. For example, two soldiers, one an infantryman and the other a
supply clerk, have identical knee injuries. The finding that the infantryman is unfit
does not mean that the supply clerk, or even another infantryman with the same
injury, also would be considered unfit.
Julian, supra note 27, at 32. MOS stands for military occupational specialty—it is essentially a job
description, such as pilot, mechanic, cook, infantryman, etc. Id. at 31.
52. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 3-1(c), at 3–4.
53. Id. § 3-1(c)–(d), at 3–4.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 4-19(e)(1)(a), at 15.
56. Id. § 4-19(e)(1)(b), at 15.
57. Id. § 3-2(b)(2), at 4–5.
58. Id.
59. Julian, supra note 27, at 32.
60. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-19(i), at 16–17.
61. Id.; see id. § 4-19(f), at 15–16; see also Pardue, supra note 27, at 155 (listing eligibility
requirements to receive benefits under the Army disability system).
62. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § B-3, at 66.
63. Id. § 4-19(i), at 16–17.
64. Id. § 3-5(d), at 6.
65. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
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After finding the soldier unfit, the PEB then rates the severity of the
disability according to the standards for each unfitting medical condition
set forth in the VASRD, as modified for Army use.66 The percentage of
disability helps determine the amount of compensation and benefits that a
medically discharged soldier receives.67 If a soldier is rated at 30%
disabled or higher,68 he receives a pension based upon the percentage of
disability, years of service, and rank.69 Additionally, the soldier and his
family continue to receive military health care and other benefits afforded
to military members and retirees.70 If a soldier receives less than a 30%
rating, then the soldier receives a one-time severance payment based on
time-in-service and rank.71
If the PEB assigns a 30% or higher disability rating to an unfit soldier,
the PEB’s final determination is whether to permanently retire the soldier
or place him on temporary retirement.72 If the PEB deems that the soldier’s
condition is not stable, meaning that it could either improve or degenerate,
the soldier may be placed on the Temporary Disabled Retirement List, or
TDRL.73 A soldier may remain on the TDRL for up to five years,74 at
which time he will be placed on permanent disability retirement, given
severance pay for a disability rating of less than 30%, or declared fit for
duty.75 During this period, the soldier receives all benefits as if he were
permanently retired,76 but is required to undergo physical examinations and
periodic PEB evaluations for the purposes of re-evaluation and final
determination.77 After any periodic re-evaluation, however, a final
determination may be made on a soldier’s case.78

66. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-19(i), at 16–17. For an example of a VASRD rating for
hypertension, see 38 C.F.R. § 4.104 (2008). See also EDWIN DORN, DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION
NO. 1332.39, APPLICATION OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION SCHEDULE FOR RATING DISABILITIES
58–62 (Nov. 14, 1996), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/133239p.pdf.
67. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 46.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Pardue, supra note 27, at 166–67.
70. Pardue, supra note 27, at 167.
71. Id. at 169. The difference in value between severance pay for a disability rating under
30% and disability retirement provides a powerful incentive for soldiers deemed unfit for service to
seek the maximum rating supported by their condition. See Testimony of Chairman Scott, supra
note 20 and accompanying text. At the same time, it provides a possible incentive for the Army to
minimize such ratings. Id.
72. See Novak, supra note 27, at 279–80.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 280; see also AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 7-7, at 47.
75. Novak, supra note 27, at 280.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 7-4, at 47.
78. See AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 7-7, at 47; Novak, supra note 27, at 280.
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The decisions outlined above are first made by an informal PEB
board.79 The informal PEB records its findings and forwards the results to
the soldier through a liaison officer, normally located at the soldier's
military installation.80 At this point, the soldier must choose whether or not
to concur with the PEB’s decision; if the soldier does not concur, he may
demand a formal hearing or submit a rebuttal while waiving the formal
hearing.81
If the soldier concurs with the findings, the case moves to the United
States Army Human Resources Command (USAHRC) for final
disposition.82 If the soldier does not concur and submits a rebuttal without
requesting a formal board, then the PEB will respond to the soldier.83
According to the regulation, “[w]hen the Soldier’s rebuttal does not result
in a change to the PEB’s findings, the response will acknowledge receipt
of the rebuttal and explain the PEB’s decision to adhere to the earlier
findings.”84 Otherwise, the PEB will modify the findings in the soldier’s
favor.85 The PEB may also modify results of an informal board when
additional medical or other evidence necessitates such a change.86
Non-concurrence and election of a formal hearing is more complex:
While it is the soldier’s absolute right to request a formal
board, there are certain hazards associated with having a
formal board. The formal board is not bound by decisions
made during the informal board process, as it is a “de novo”
proceeding. Therefore, if the soldier elects a formal board, he
may have his disability rating raised, lowered or maintained.
In addition, the formal board may find the soldier fit and
return him to duty or recommend further tests at the M[edical]
T[reatment] F[acility].87
This de novo standard is authorized by the regulatory language, “The
[formal] PEB may change, modify, or correct its findings and
recommendations at any time . . . .”88 After the soldier receives the formal
proceeding’s findings, the soldier may concur in the results, at which time
the case will be forwarded for final disposition, or the soldier may provide
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-20(a), at 19.
Id. § 4-20(b), at 19.
Id. § 4-20(c)(1)(a)–(d), at 19.
Id. § 4-20(e)(1), at 20.
Id. § 4-20(e)(2), at 20.
Id. § 4-20(e)(5), at 20.
Id. § 4-20(e)(6), (f)(1)(b), at 20.
Id. § 4-20(f)(2), at 20.
Hoffmeister, supra note 27, at 50.
AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-21(r)(2), at 25.
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a rebuttal indicating his reasons for disagreeing.89 This rebuttal is limited
to a few grounds, such as fraud.90 If the rebuttal does not spur a change in
the findings, the PEB will respond to the soldier indicating the reasons that
the decision of the formal PEB will stand.91
If the soldier does not concur with the final findings of either the
informal or formal PEB (as well as in other limited circumstances), the
United States Army Physical Disability Agency (USAPDA) reviews the
case.92 The USAPDA may revise the findings, concur in the result, or
remand the case to the PEB.93 If the USAPDA concurs in the PEB’s results
or modifies the findings and the soldier concurs, the case moves to the
USAHRC for final disposition regarding the discharge or retention of the
soldier.94 At this point, the Army Board for the Correction of Military
Records (ABCMR) is the only universally available administrative
recourse for a soldier or veteran wishing to appeal the Army’s decision.95
This Board is extremely deferential to the Army’s decisions and rarely
remands or overturns the decisions of the PEBs and their reviewing
agencies.96 The filing of an appeal with the ABCMR is the last step
soldiers take before suing in federal court.97
III. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARMY DISABILITY DECISIONS
Army disability decisions, whether at the initial PEB level or in a
ABCMR final review, result from the application of regulations
promulgated by the Department of Defense and the Army, pursuant to
congressional authority. Thus, the decisions are subject to administrative
law principles. This Part outlines relevant administrative law principles,
beginning with an explanation of judicial deference afforded by courts to
the services’ disability determinations. The analysis then turns to several
cases that illustrate the limits of this deference. Finally, the author’s PEB
case is used to illustrate how application of the legal principles set forth in
this Part may have led to a different outcome.98
89. Id. § 4-21(s)(1)–(2), at 25.
90. Id. § 4-21(t)(1)(a)–(c), at 25.
91. Id. § 4-21(t)(2), at 25–26.
92. See id. § 4-22(a)(1)–(7), at 26.
93. Id. § 4-22(c)(1)–(4), at 27.
94. Id. § 4-22(e)(1)–(2), at 27. Note that throughout the explanation of the Army physical
disability system in this Note, there are myriad special circumstances that may result in alternate or
additional procedures in a case at each of the administrative levels. These are not addressed as the
intent of this Part of the Note is to provide a general understanding of the process as it applies to
most soldiers.
95. Pardue, supra note 27, at 162.
96. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
97. Pardue, supra note 27, at 162.
98. For the reader to understand the application of the legal principles discussed infra, it is
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A. Judicial Review of Agency Legal Interpretations
The seminal case regarding review of an administrative agency’s
interpretation of a statute is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.99 In that case, the Supreme Court set forth what has
come to be known as the Chevron Doctrine.100
When reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute, courts must first
determine whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue at hand.101 If
Congress has spoken, courts must not adopt any other interpretation and
congressional intent will control.102 To determine whether Congress
expressed an intent regarding the statute, the court must first examine the
text of the statute itself.103 If the statutory language is ambiguous, then
courts should examine legislative history to glean congressional intent.104
If the history and statutory text are ambiguous, and there is no explicit
necessary to establish the background of the author’s disability case. The author, a veteran Iraq war
commander, was a U.S. Army aviator who was medically grounded from flight duties because of
symptoms later determined to be asthma. He was denied career-enhancing reassignments, incentive
pay, and was restricted from deployment and certain physical activities normally associated with
duty. He was processed through the Army disability system, and an informal PEB found him unfit
for duty with a disability rating of 10%. He then filed a rebuttal and requested informal
reconsideration of his case, based chiefly on his prescription for daily asthma medication, which,
according to the VASRD, qualified for a 30% disability rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.97 (2008). Upon
reconsideration, the PEB did not address the issue appealed, the level of disability, but instead
found the author fit for duty, precluding any need to address the disability rating. The author, faced
with the same career restrictions as before his finding of fitness, elected to leave the service and
received no benefits from the Army. The author does not imply that his medical condition is similar
in severity to that of many brave servicemen and women who have been grievously wounded in
combat, but it is his hope that this Note will assist the services in providing just disability decisions
for these brave warriors. This Note is intended to be constructive, and is motivated by a genuine
concern for the welfare of disabled veterans. Further, although the author discloses certain personal
medical information for the purposes of this Note, he does not waive HIPAA protections beyond
the scope of what is revealed herein and does not authorize the release of any medical information
relating to his case without his express written permission. The author maintains on file all relevant
material regarding his case.
99. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a discussion of how courts have applied Chevron in other areas
of the law, see Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 202–13 (2008) (discussing Chevron’s application to the
SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule); Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Note, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck—
Regulating Away Alien Ineligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and
Sound Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713, 722–26 (2006) (discussing Chevron’s application
to agency immigration decisions).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 296–97 (2001). For a basic
understanding of the Chevron Doctrine, see Dustin G. Hall, Note, The Elephant in the Room:
Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 202–04 (2008).
101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
102. Id. at 842–43.
103. See id. at 859–61.
104. See id. at 862–64.
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delegation of authority to the agency, the Chevron Court stated that
delegation to the agency is implied.105 In any event, where a statute and its
legislative history are ambiguous and there is either an explicit or implicit
delegation of authority to the agency to interpret the statute, courts will
defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable, and is not
arbitrary and capricious.106
In a subsequent case, United States v. Mead Corp.,107 the Court stated
that the Chevron Doctrine’s high level of deference only applied where
Congress intended for the agency to act with the “force of law.”108 If a
court finds that Congress did not have such an intent, then the agency’s
interpretation is subject to lesser deference under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.109 Federal courts have applied Chevron deference to the military’s
interpretations of disability statutes.110 This deference comports with the
language of Title 10 of the United States Code, § 1216(a),111 which gives
broad authority to the military services to administer the disability
system.112 Further, courts have applied Chevron deference not only to the
services’ interpretations of statutes concerned with disability proceedings,
but also to the services’ interpretations of its own regulations.113 Thus,
while the military must follow its regulations,114 reasonable interpretations
of military regulations receive extreme deference from the courts.115
105. See id. at 865–66.
106. Id.
107. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
108. Id. at 226–27.
109. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see id. at 140 (holding that agency actions are not controlling by
virtue of the inherent authority of the agency, but such actions should be afforded deference
commensurate with their thoroughness and consistency).
110. See, e.g., Sorrough v. United States, 295 F.2d 919, 922 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (per curiam)
(stating that an Air Force regulation “establish[ing] the presumption that any disease contracted by
a member of the Air Force while on active duty was incurred in line of duty unless there was
substantial proof that the contracting of the disease came within one of several excepted categories”
had force of law); Prichard v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 420, 422 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that
Army regulations relating to compensation for service-connected disability were reasonably
designed to carry into effect Acts of Congress and had force and effect of law).
111. 10 U.S.C. § 1216 (2006).
112. See id. § 1216(a).
113. See Wronke v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“If the applicable
regulations are interpreted by the [armed services] in a reasonable manner, any charge of procedural
irregularity must fail even though the [plaintiff] may present another reasonable interpretation of the
regulations.” (citing Wronke v. Marsh, 603 F. Supp. 407, 412 (C.D. Ill. 1985))).
114. See Biddle v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 87, 95 (1968) (holding that the military services
are bound by their own regulations).
115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. But see John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
612, 676–77 (1996) (arguing that deference to agency interpretations of the regulations it prescribes
leads to vague and arbitrary results and opens up administrative policymaking to excessive interest
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B. Judicial Review of Agency Factual Findings
Courts also give deference to agency determinations of fact. A federal
court stated that “responsibility for determining who is fit or unfit to serve
in the armed services is not a judicial province; . . . courts cannot substitute
their judgment for that of the military departments when reasonable minds
could reach differing conclusions on the same evidence.”116 Further, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof when seeking review of a military
disability decision.117 Particularly for military disability cases, the
reviewing court is limited to determining if the service’s decision was
“arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to
applicable statutes and regulations.”118
This standard of review, oft cited in military disability cases,119 mixes
two distinct standards of review pertaining to administrative decision
making: the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary and capricious
standard. Because the substantial evidence test is generally considered to
be a more difficult standard of review for an administrative agency to
withstand,120 it is difficult to imagine that a litigant would seek review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,121 the Supreme Court construed
the meaning of “substantial evidence” under the Administrative Procedure
Act.122 The Court rejected the notion that an agency action was supported
by substantial evidence if the “reviewing court could find in the record
evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board’s
findings.”123 While substantial evidence review is neither de novo review,
nor intended to countervail the expertise held by administrative agencies in
making decisions, “[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,”124 and “a reviewing
group influence).
116. Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted).
117. Rose v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 510, 512 (1996).
118. de Cicco v. United States, 677 F.2d 66, 70 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
119. See, for example, cases cited by Banerjee v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 522, 533 (Fed. Cl.
2007).
120. See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 182, 186 (1935) (employing
the arbitrary and capricious standard in ruling, where the agency made no findings of fact to support
its action, that “where the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the
presumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches . . . to orders of
administrative bodies”); cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (holding
that agency decisions must be supported by substantial evidence in light of the evidence contained
in the entire administrative record).
121. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
122. See id. at 477.
123. Id. at 478.
124. Id. at 488.
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court is not barred from setting aside a . . . decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety
furnishes.”125
The Court of Claims clearly applied the substantial evidence test in
Jordan v. United States,126 reversing the decision of the ABCMR regarding
Plaintiff's fitness for military duty. The court stated:
Even though defendant’s evidence in the instant case,
considered of and by itself, might support the administrative
decision by the Army to discharge plaintiff as physically fit,
we find, as hereinafter discussed, that there is “opposing
evidence [principally, plaintiff’s medical record with the VA]
so substantial in character” as to detract from the weight of
the evidence in support of the Army discharge, and to render
it “less than substantial on the record as a whole.”127
Yet even the Jordan Court, while clearly applying the substantial
evidence test, referred to the Army’s action as “arbitrary [and]
capricious.”128 This language confuses the appropriate standard of review
for military disability cases. Indeed, in other cases, courts, while purporting
to use the substantial evidence test, appear not to actually employ it,
instead showing extreme deference to the military services under an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.129
Given the great importance of arriving at correct decisions in military
disability cases, PEBs and military review authorities should formulate
their conclusions so that their decisions will satisfy the substantial
evidence standard. Doing so will necessarily mandate a thorough and
consistent depth of analysis in each case and lead to clear and wellreasoned explanations of the findings.
125. Id.
126. 205 Ct. Cl. 65 (1974).
127. Id. at 73 (quoting Ward v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 210, 217 (1967)). It is interesting
that a VA disability rating, while not dispositive, tends to diminish the validity of contrary findings
by the Army under the substantial evidence test. Id. This ruling seems directly contrary to numerous
ABCMR rulings that disregard VA evidence when reviewing PEB determinations. See, e.g.,
ABCMR, Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC97-06529, supra note 35; supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
128. See Jordan, 205 Ct. Cl. at 84.
129. “To prevail under the arbitrary and capricious standard, plaintiff must demonstrate that
evidence was ignored or unreasonably construed, or that designated duties were not performed by
the AFBCMR. . . . ‘While the court might disagree with the board's decision, it cannot substitute its
own judgment for the board’s if reasonable minds could reach differing resolutions of a disputed
fact.’” Banerjee v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 522, 533 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (quoting Fluellen v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 97, 101 (Fed. Cl. 1999)).
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C. Limitations on Deference to Military Disability Decisions
Federal courts, primarily the Court of Federal Claims, tend to defer to
the decisions of the military services regarding disability.130 This
deferential treatment, coupled with the burden of the plaintiff to show by
clear and convincing evidence a defect in the disability decision, makes it
difficult indeed for a soldier or veteran to prevail in an appeal of a
disability claim.131
Even so, a body of law demonstrates the outer limits of judicial
deference. First, it is imperative that a military board articulate proper
grounds for its decisions. The Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp.132
held that the propriety of an administrative decision must be decided based
only on the reasons given by the agency itself.133
Further, even though an administrative agency is free to change or
reverse course from a previous decision, the agency must provide a
reasoned explanation for the change.134 Courts look unfavorably upon
disability boards that change disability ratings in subsequent proceedings
even though there is no change in the evidence.135
130. “Judicial deference to administrative decisions of fitness for duty of service members is
and of right should be the norm.” Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
131. See Colon v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 473, 484 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (stating that plaintiff
“bears the burden of establishing by ‘cogent and clearly convincing evidence’ that the ABCMR’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law”
(quoting Wronke v. Marsh, 787 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986))); see also Dorl v. United States,
200 Ct. Cl. 626, 633 (1973).
132. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
133. Id. at 196. A later case further explained:
Normally, an agency [decision] would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make
up for such deficiencies . . . .
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
134. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42.
135. In disapproving one disability board’s downward revision of a disability rating, the court
stated:
Just 6 weeks after an MB recommended retention on the TDRL, the PEB suddenly
determined that plaintiff’s condition had stabilized, and that his condition
warranted only a 10-percent rating due to the “improvement” plaintiff experienced
while on the TDRL. As far as we can determine, this decision was based on
exactly the same medical evidence as led the MB to conclude that plaintiff’s
condition had not stabilized.
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Another notable case, Beckham v. United States,136 held that a military
service may not, because of a service member’s medical condition, move
that person among multiple duty assignments until a job is found that the
person can incidentally perform despite the medical condition, and then
use that assignment to declare him fit for duty.137 The Beckham court
stated: “[T]he [military] cannot shift an officer from assignment to
assignment until a job is located that is not affected by the officer’s
physical disability.”138
Perhaps the most scathing reversal of a service’s disability
determination by a court is Van Cleave v. United States.139 In that case, a
pro se veteran filed suit against the government, alleging arbitrary and
capricious decision making by the Navy PEB and Board of Corrections of
Naval Records (BCNR).140 Plaintiff suffered debilitating headaches while
on active duty in the Navy and, in 1997, was rated at 10% disability by the
Navy PEB.141 Plaintiff accepted the findings of the informal board and was
discharged with severance pay.142
Subsequently, Plaintiff discovered that the PEB rated him based upon
an incorrect diagnosis of chronic headaches rather than migraine
headaches, and he petitioned the BCNR for upward adjustment of his
disability rating.143 The Van Cleave court remanded the case to the BCNR
for further review, noting that Plaintiff was not rated according to his
actual medical condition, that the difference between a 10% and 30%
rating was only the frequency of prostrating migraine headaches , and that
Plaintiff’s rating may change based on the BCNR’s knowledge that
Plaintiff’s headaches were, in fact, migraines rather than ordinary
headaches.144
On remand, the BCNR had found that the evidence did not reveal error
or injustice in Plaintiff’s disability rating.145 The BCNR attacked Plaintiff’s
credibility, stating that the diagnosis of his migraines was based on his
subjective reports to his physicians, that just because he was prescribed
medications for migraines did not mean that he required the medications to
treat migraines, and that his real motivation for seeking discharge was
because he was over the body-fat standards established by the Navy, a
Istivan v. United States, 689 F.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
136. 392 F.2d 619 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
137. Id. at 623.
138. Id.
139. 70 Fed. Cl. 674 (2006).
140. Id. at 675–78.
141. Id. at 675.
142. Id. at 675–76.
143. Id. at 676.
144. Id. at 676–77.
145. Id. at 677–78.
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condition that would have precluded his promotion and continuation on
active duty.146 The BCNR further stated that his “habit of lying down in a
dark room [during the] headache[s] d[id] not [establish] that the headaches
were prostrating,”—part of the criteria for rating migraines—and also that
a more “hale” individual would have been able to continue his duties.147
The BCNR also used evidence of Plaintiff’s performance, namely his
evaluation reports, as evidence that he was performing his duties
satisfactorily, while simultaneously making veiled accusations of
malingering, to support the position that Plaintiff did not deserve an
increased rating.148 Finally, the BCNR attacked Plaintiff’s reliance on his
disability counselor’s advice, stating “that plaintiff could not be believed
because ‘[he] relied on a summary of the [PEB’s] findings provided by
[his] disability counselor, a mess management specialist chief petty officer,
whose normal duties prior to becoming a counselor probably consisted of
cooking, operating a dining facility, and/or managing military quarters.’”149
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Court of Federal Claims, alleging
bad faith on the part of the BCNR and also alleging that the BCNR’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.150 After stating that
“[t]his court assumes the regularity of military records and the good faith
of government officials,”151 the court went on to deliver a scathing elevenpage opinion, holding that the BCNR’s actions evidenced bad faith and
were per se arbitrary and capricious.152
In its reasoning, the court stated that by making unwarranted attacks on
Plaintiff’s credibility, toughness, and motivations, rather than addressing
the issues raised by Plaintiff, BCNR failed in its mandate.153 Further, the
court required the BCNR to satisfactorily articulate the reasons for its
decision.154 The court pointed out that the record clearly did not support
the BCNR’s findings, especially given the reasons the BCNR offered.155
Additionally, the court offered several other insights applicable to other
disability cases. First, it presumed that medication prescribed to treat a
specific medical condition was convincing evidence that the service
member required such medicine to treat the condition.156 Second, the court
146. Id. at 678.
147. Id. at 678, 682, 684.
148. Id. at 685.
149. Id. at 683.
150. Id. at 678.
151. Id. at 679.
152. Id. at 684.
153. Id. at 679.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. “We are not aware that physicians routinely prescribe medications for ailments from
which they think their patients do not suffer, nor does the record show that Mr. Van Cleave’s
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inferred that administrative boards may not use personnel evaluations to
demonstrate fitness performance while at the same time questioning, either
directly or indirectly, the credibility of a service member to claim fitness or
justify a minimal disability rating.157 Finally, the court rejected the
government’s contention that Plaintiff’s failure to seek medical attention
for headaches for a time indicated Plaintiff did not experience headaches
during this period, especially considered in the light of medical treatment
Plaintiff had received to cope with the condition.158
These cases are only a sample of the body of law on military disability
cases. Despite their varying facts, these cases provide a framework that
military disability officials and their counsel may use to ensure consistent
and legally sufficient disability findings. Application of these legal
principles will improve the depth of analysis in disability cases and thereby
also improve the outcome of disability decisions.
D. Application of Administrative Law Principles to a Disability
Case
The author’s case159 provides several issues that may be analyzed under
the preceding legal framework. This analysis shows that thoughtful
application of the law can lead to better disability decisions.
First, in its initial informal consideration of his case, the PEB found that
the author was medically unfit for duty and rated him as 10% disabled
under the VASRD. The PEB reasoned that because the author did not seek
emergency treatment for asthma attacks during a period during which he
was not prescribed medication for asthma, he did not require the
medication prescribed by his physicians. Under the VASRD, a soldier who
requires daily medication for asthma is entitled to a 30% disability

doctors followed such a protocol here.” Id. at 680.
157. Id. at 685.
The BCNR charged plaintiff with malingering throughout its decision, yet when it
suited the Board’s purpose, it commented on plaintiff’s high standards of
performance. Its purposes were to bring plaintiff’s “overweight condition” to the
court’s attention once again; and to suggest that his migraine headaches must not
have been severe enough to interfere with his performance. The Board managed to
use even Mr. Van Cleave’s positive performance evaluations against him.
Id.
158. Id. at 682–83. The court recognized that medical attention during the attacks was difficult
and unnecessary. Id. at 683.
159. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss3/6

20

Van Lierop: Post-9/11 Army Disability Decisions: Reinforcing Administrative L

2009]

POST-9/11 ARMY DISABILITY DECISIONS

659

rating,160 which qualifies the soldier and his family for a pension, medical
care, and other disability retirement benefits.161
The author’s medical records reveal that physicians prescribed asthma
medications for the author’s daily use to treat his condition, and his
medical records contained annotations confirming that he required these
medications. The PEB, however, concluded that not seeking emergency
medical attention outweighed this evidence, even though emergency
medical treatment is not a criterion for a 30% VASRD disability rating for
asthma. The PEB based its rationale on the dubious premise that only
persons who seek emergency treatment for a medical condition require
medication for that condition.
The PEB’s determination fails the substantial evidence standard under
Universal Camera and Jordan.162 Under this standard, “[t]he substantiality
of [the] evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight.”163 In the author’s case, the PEB disregarded
uncontroverted evidence of the author’s requirement for medication in
favor of a logically flawed rationale—the dubious premise underlying the
PEB’s conclusion that the author does not need medication requires as
much proof as the conclusion it supports. The Van Cleave Court addressed
the military’s disregard of physician-prescribed drugs in disability cases.164
“We are not aware that physicians routinely prescribe medications for
ailments from which they think their patients do not suffer, nor does the
record show that [plaintiff’s] doctors followed such a protocol here.”165
Further, even assuming, arguendo, that there was a legitimate reason for
the 10% disability rating assigned to the author, the PEB failed to articulate
that rationale. Thus, under Chenery and State Farm, the decision in the
author’s case cannot stand on the basis put forward by the PEB.166
The author’s case also provides an example of a colorable issue
regarding the PEB’s interpretation of Army regulations. After the Board’s
initial determination of unfitness with 10% disability, the author, in good
faith, requested an informal reconsideration and submitted a rebuttal
arguing for an increased disability rating. The PEB reconsidered its
previous decision and, instead of modifying or confirming its previous
160. 38 C.F.R. § 4.97 (2008); see also ABCMR, Memorandum of Consideration, No. AC9405416, available at http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/CY1994/00000-13999/9405416.rtf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2009) (remanding a decision of the PEB and concluding that daily asthma
controller medications necessitated a disability rating greater than 10%).
161. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text.
163. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
164. Van Cleave v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 674, 680 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
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disability rating, reversed its fitness finding, finding the author fit for duty.
Implicit in this reversal is the PEB’s interpretation of AR 635-40, that
the PEB has the authority, in an informal reconsideration, to reverse the
finding of fitness where a soldier’s rebuttal only addresses a disability
rating increase.167 In the case of a rebuttal submitted with a waiver of a
formal board, AR 635-40 states that unless the Board changes its findings
based on the rebuttal, it “will” state the reasons for adherence to the
previous findings.168 In contrast, the portion of the regulation that governs
formal hearings states, “[t]he PEB may change, modify, or correct its
findings and recommendations at any time before the record of
proceedings is delivered to the CG, USAPDA or Commander, USA
HRC.”169 No such authority is prescribed in the portion of the regulation
concerning informal reconsiderations.170 Under the maxim of construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,171 the absence of this authority in AR
635-40 § 4-20(e) and its specific inclusion in § 4-21(r) lead to the
conclusion that the only revision in an informal PEB reconsideration
should be based on the soldier’s rebuttal.
While AR 635-40 allows the PEB to change previous decisions outside
a formal hearing, this power is only applicable when new evidence is
presented that was not available to the Board during its initial
consideration.172 In the author’s case, however, the PEB justified its new
conclusion based on the officer’s evaluation reports, medical records, and
physical profile limitations, all of which were considered in the PEB’s
initial decision.
Finally, notwithstanding the question of whether the PEB possessed the
authority to revise its fitness finding in an informal reconsideration, the
PEB’s revised factual determination that the author was fit for duty is also
susceptible to critical analysis. Instead of addressing the author’s
contention that he was eligible for 30% disability under the VASRD, the
PEB reversed its own previous finding, made just two weeks earlier, and
declared him fit for duty. While the PEB was authorized to reverse its own

167. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
169. AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-21(r)(2), at 25. CG stands for Commanding General,
USAPD stands for United States Army Physical Disability Agency, and USAHRC stands for United
States Army Human Rescources Command.
170. Id. § 4-20(e), at 20.
171. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 538 (1990) (“[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
172. See AR 635-40, supra note 38, § 4-20(e), at 20.
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decision, it must provide a reasoned explanation for doing so.173 The PEB
made no attempt to explain its changed finding regarding the author’s
fitness.174
To support its conclusion of fitness, the PEB cited the author’s
excellent performance evaluations and reiterated its conclusion that the
author did not require asthma medication. In addition to the inadequacy of
the PEB’s conclusion regarding the necessity for asthma medication,175 the
remainder of the PEB’s explanation for its finding relied upon the same
evidence it used to find a directly contrary finding just two weeks earlier.
Courts look unfavorably on disability decisions that, without further
explanation, change earlier findings based on previously considered
evidence.176
Further, under the substantial evidence test, the propriety of the PEB’s
decision can only be determined in light of the entire record.177 While
some of the evidence, namely a positive evaluation report, supports the
PEB’s conclusion in isolation, the courts impose a higher standard.178
In this case, the PEB disregarded evidence that the author, an aviator,
could not pilot aircraft due to his medical condition and could not deploy
to combat. This evidence seemed sufficient for the conclusion that the
author could not perform the duties required of his military specialty.179
Additionally, the author was moved to different positions twice due to his
medical condition. As previously stated, a service may not move a person
from position to position until locating a job that the person may
incidentally perform, despite medical limitations, then use that
performance as a basis for finding the person fit for duty.180 Finally, the
author’s final evaluation report, though favorable, stated that he could not
perform his duties as a staff officer because of asthma. On the entire
record, it would appear that the PEB’s revised fitness finding was not
supported by substantial evidence.
173. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42 (1983).
174. On June 2, 2006, the PEB stated, “The findings of the PEB are the Soldier’s medical
and physical impairment prevents reasonable performance of duties required by grade and
military specialty.” On June 16, 2006, after its informal reconsideration, the PEB stated, “Based
on a review of the objective medical and personnel evidence of record and considering the
physical requirements for reasonable performance of duties required by grade and military
specialty, the PEB finds the soldier fit for duty . . . .” The explanation given for the revised
findings were based only on evidence available to the PEB in its June 2 determination.
175. See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
178. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478 (1951) (holding that an agency
action is not supported by substantial evidence simply because “the reviewing court could find in
the record evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board’s findings”).
179. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
180. See Beckham v. United States, 392 F.2d 619, 623 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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IV. CONCLUSION: REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM-UP
This Note provides decision makers in the Army disability system a
legal framework to guide their determinations. While it does not
encompass the entire body of law on disability decisions or the myriad
facts involved in individual disability cases, this Note shows that applying
administrative law principles, including making decisions in accordance
with the substantial evidence standard, leads to more sustainable and
correct disability decisions. Even if most cases are correctly decided, there
is no acceptable margin of error in the Army disability system, especially
where improper decisions cause hardships for soldiers and their families.
The twin purposes of the military disability system are to provide for a
fit and ready force and to care for those soldiers who become ill or injured
in the line of duty. Given general dissatisfaction with the recent counterintuitive trends of the Army disability system as described in Part I of this
Note, there is no doubt that global reform of the disability system will lead
to substantial improvements in the consistency and accuracy of the
disability system. No amount of reform, however, will be effective unless
the decision makers in the disability process have the tools to make legally
sufficient decisions.
To say a remedy is available in the courts for those unfortunate enough
to have their disability case improperly adjudicated belies the reality that
many soldiers, especially those who are physically infirm and financially
burdened, may not have the means to litigate their claims. Rather, ensuring
the maximum accuracy of decisions from the outset will alleviate the
hardships that a soldier will incur as the result of an improperly decided
case.
Consider, as an example of these hardships, United States Army
Sergeant Daniel Webb, who recalls his first back injury on a night infantry
patrol in Iraq: “One minute, I’m standing; the next minute, I’m on the
ground.”181 Sergeant Webb had fallen in a hole; he was given pain
medication and continued the patrol.182 A week later, on another night
mission, a wall collapsed on him, exacerbating his injuries.183 “It got to the
point where I just couldn’t take it anymore. I felt like I couldn’t really
walk, could hardly move,” said Webb.184 Sergeant Webb was found to
have three herniated discs, but was not a candidate for spinal fusion;
instead, doctors implanted a morphine pump to help him manage the
chronic pain.185
181. NewsHour: Veterans Struggle for Adequate Disability Compensation, (PBS television
broadcast Jul. 23, 2007) (available at PBS Online NewsHour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
military/july-dec07/disability_07-23.html) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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The Army found Sergeant Webb unfit for continued military service
due to his medical condition, but instead of rating his disability sufficiently
severe to merit permanent medical retirement and the concomitant pay and
benefits of such a status, he was given a 10% disability rating and a onetime severance check of $30,000.186 Neither he nor his family has access to
military healthcare or any other benefits.187 Webb’s attorney, who works
with Disabled Veterans of America, maintains that Webb’s disability was
severely underrated: “It’s a very bad decision for Sergeant Webb. His case
has been terribly underrated. And the other bad news is that he is by no
means alone. We’ve looked at this point at several hundred of these, and
we have yet to find one that we looked at and we thought, ‘This was done
right.’”188
Sergeant Webb appealed the disability decision, but was unable to
secure a higher rating.189 Instead, he moved his family from their quarters
on base to a campsite until he could find affordable housing.190
The importance of correct analysis in PEB decisions cannot be
overstated. While some veterans have the opportunity, resources, and
ability to overcome improper disability decisions, others are not so
fortunate. For these disadvantaged veterans, even if they have the means to
litigate the PEB decision and are successful, the reality is that they need
benefits sooner, not later, to help them transition to a productive civilian
life. The federal court system is not the appropriate venue for such a timely
remedy.
It is incumbent on all players in the Army disability system to redouble
their efforts to stay abreast of developing administrative law principles,
especially as they relate to disability decisions. Part III of this Note can be
the starting point of that effort, and PEBs and legal counsel can use it to
assist in the proper application of administrative law. Our soldiers deserve
no less.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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